Judicial Discretion in the Civil Law by MacLean, Roberto G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 43 | Number 1
September 1982
Judicial Discretion in the Civil Law
Roberto G. MacLean
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Roberto G. MacLean, Judicial Discretion in the Civil Law, 43 La. L. Rev. (1982)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol43/iss1/7
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE CIVIL LAW*
Roberto G. MacLean**
In Cervantes' Don Quixote, when Sancho Panza was appointed
governor of the Barataria Island, he was required by the villagers
to try a number of cases as judge. One of those cases involved a law
requiring every person who entered the village over a particular
bridge to declare his purpose for entering the village. If the person
told the truth, he was allowed to go free; but if he told a lie, as punish-
ment, he was hanged at the gallows next to the bridge. One day a
man, who when crossing the bridge into the village was asked why
he was going there, said, "I am going to be hanged." Thus, if the
man were let go, he would have told a lie and should have been
hanged; but, if he were hanged, he would have told the truth and
should have been let go. In either instance the solution was legally
unsatisfactory.
Contemporary lawyers are as cunning as Cervantes' villagers, and
changing social, economic, political, and cultural circumstances place
the contemporary judge in situations where there is in the law no
express disposition to guide him. In our times, certain factors such
as inflation and existing family relations present the judge with every-
day problems for which there is no express guidance in the law. The
questions that must be resolved are how such changes in social,
political, economic, and cultural circumstances should be faced and
whether the Civil Law is adequately equipped to meet that challenge.
One of the most effective ways by which a legal system can do this
is through the discretionary powers given to its judges.
In evaluating such powers, one must first determine what the
general image of the discretionary powers of the judiciary is in the
Civil Law. One of the leading comparatists in this country, Professor
John H. Merryman, has said:
[In the Civil Law a judge is] a kind of expert clerk. He is presented
with a fact situation to which a ready legislative response will
be readily found in all except the extraordinary case. His func-
tion is merely to find the right legislative provision, couple it with
the fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or less
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automatically produced from the union. The whole process of
judicial decision is made to fit into the formal syllogism of
scholastic logic. The major premise is in the statute, the facts of
the case furnish the minor premise, and the conclusion inevitably
follows . ...
The net image is of the judge as an operator of a machine
designed and built by legislators ...
Judicial service is a bureaucratic career; the judge is a func-
tionary, a civil servant; the judicial function is narrow, mechanical,
and uncreative.'
A distinguished Louisiana scholar, Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, states
in his well-known Louisiana Civil Law System: "A rational judicial
process involves always determination of issues in accordance with
the requirements of formal logic. The judicial decision is a conclusion
reached on the basis of .syllogism: rules of law furnish the major
premise, fact situations form the minor premise, and the conclusion
follows with logical necessity."' To this, he adds: "Once the problem
is cast in this form, the result follows with inescapable necessity. There
is no room for discretion because formal logic is compelling."3 A French
scholar, Professor Roger Perrot, once described the Civil Law judge
as "a colossus with clay feet."" In the common talk among lawyers,
it has even been said that in the Civil Law system legislators are
almost like gods, and judges not even men.
The foundations, if not the justificatons, for this image of the Civil
Law judge are of two kinds: historical and structural. Among the
historical reasons, traced to Rome, one finds that in the Roman legal
system the Civil Law judge's predecessor, the iudex, was not a pro-
minent man of the law. For a long time he was a layman who en-
joyed rather low social prestige, because the post was often gained
through royal or political favors and, in some cases, was even bought
by the candidate. This situation gave rise to the attitude that judges
were not fair, honest, and hard working, and that instead they
rendered their judgments in favor of the most powerful. The code
instituted by Frederick the Great of Prussia attempted to be judge-
proof; it contained over 16,000 articles and left no room for judicial
interpretation. In fact, the judge was forbidden to interpret the law.
1. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 37-39 (1969).
2. A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 89 (1977).
3. Id. at 90.
4. Perrot, The Judge: The Extent and Limit of His Role in Civil Matters, 50 TUL.
L. REV. 495 (1976).
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In France, the theory of separation of powers, which arose during
and after the Revolution as a reaction to abuses committed by judges,
in effect put judges "on probation" in society.
Besides these historical factors, there are certain structural reasons
for not granting ample discretionary powers to the judge. Among these
reasons is the idea that a code is a self-sufficient, self-contained body
of law that needs no discretionary assistance. Related to this idea
is the principle that reason must prevail over experience, for one must
remember that at one time reason was the goddess of philosophy.
The influence of Kant and the rationalist philosophy had reached its
height, and there was a strong reaction against the use of mere ex-
perience and pragmatism. As a second structural reason, in some Civil
Law countries there exists the crime of prevarication, which is a crime
committed almost solely by judges. Prevarication consists of render-
ing a judgment that goes against the text of the law; this, of course,
creates a serious drawback to granting discretionary powers to the
judge. A third structural reason is that some judges are not as creative
as others; their case loads and routine are enemies of judicial discre-
tion. When a judge has a large case load and routinely approaches
his daily work, he will find it easier to act mechanically and more
difficult to exercise his potential discretion.
The propositions submitted herein are: The image of the Civil Law
judge is somewhat exaggerated to the point of distortion. The Civil
Law judge enjoys a wider discretion than is commonly believed. His
accepted image has arisen as a result of a different cultural approach.
And, when comparatists examine the Civil Law judge, they must con-
sider how the judge functions within the general context of the system
in which he operates.
Like the factors supporting the accepted image of the Civil Law
judge, the arguments favoring the contrary propositions are both
historical and structural. One of the historical arguments against the
accepted image is that even if it is true that the iudex in Rome did
not enjoy very high prestige, the Roman judicial system did offer other
mechanisms for exercising wide judicial discretion, both by the praetor
and through the ius honorarium. The ius honorarium itself provided
ample flexibility and creativity within the Roman judicial system.
One now finds that the judiciary enjoys in some Civil Law coun-
tries an increasing prestige and importance. Common and familiar ex-
amples of this heightened stature are the importance of jurisprudence
constante and the rising number of new cases in which court deci-
sions have a binding force in Civil Law countries. Some examples of
this phenomenon in Latin America are the Amparo law of Mexico,
19821
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the Suumula of the Supreme Court of Brazil, and the decisions of the
Civil Law Courts sitting en banque in Argentina. These developments
reveal that the role of the judge in the Civil Law, in spite of
everything else, is not decreasing. On the contrary, the judge is ob-
taining more power.
Among the structural reasons opposing the accepted image of the
Civil Law judge is the general nature in which many laws are drafted.
In Major Legal Systems in the World Today, Rene David describes
the Civil Law technique by saying: "To formulate the legal rule in
the most general terms means that it is less precise; it means that
the judge is given greater discretion in its application."' On the other
hand, the image of the judge, bound by the strictness and rigor of
formal logic, is not compatible with many of the doctrines of modern
times. Two legal philosophers working in Latin America, Professors
Recasens-Siches and Garcia Maynes, have asserted that the formal
syllogism traditionally associated with Civil Law is no longer ap-
plicable; the logic to be applied to the law is not the formal one, but
what they call "logic of the reasonable." Likewise, one of the leading
philosophers of our time, Professor Hans Kelsen, in his Pure Theory
of Law, describes the legal rule, not as an imperative in the sense
that Austin described it, but as a frame of possibilities that must be
fulfilled by the judge according to the particular characteristics of
each case.6 In view of the fact that these arguments are contrary to
the foundation of the accepted image of the Civil Law judge, it is
wise to delve more deeply into the Civil Law system in order to see
how that system works in practice.
One of the main problems which legislation must address is how
to capture reality in the few precepts of a legal rule. Many times
the information needed by the legislator to produce a new rule or
a new piece of legislation is insufficient in terms of data or elements
of fact to accurately reflect all the richness and variety of life. Many
times the interests actually in conflict in society are different from
the apparent conflicts solved by the law; hence, many times the
observer of a legal system finds contradictions between laws as they
are given and the actual behavior of people in society. Everyone who
works in a legal system- legislators, practitioners, professors, and
judges-are conscious of these contradictions. Legislators strive to
do their best both in gathering maximum information about a prob-
lem and in synthesizing that information into a rule of law; but, once
5. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 91 (2d ed.
1978).
6. H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 351 (1967).
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the legislators have completed their task, their work obtains a life
of its own. The legislators can believe justly that they did their job
in the best way they could and then turn their attention to another
problem. The attorneys for the parties involved in litigation are con-
scious of the shortcomings of a rule of law as against reality. But
they, too, can only do their best to present the cases for their clients.
The academicians are conscious of the contradictions between law and
reality. They can meditate and conjure up devices for overcoming such
contradictions, but they can also postpone solutions until a better oc-
casion for dealing with a particular contradiction arises. The only per-
son who cannot postpone or avoid a contradiction is the judge. He
is the one who must solve, here and now, all contradictions that he
finds existing between the law as it is given and the actual behavior
of people. This is so when the judge tries to be just and is not con-
tent with simply applying the mechanics of the law-when he wishes
to achieve justice in the judgment he gives.
Contradiction is inherent in the law. The moment that a statute
is posited, it begins to age and become inadequate for unanticipated
future circumstances. Life never stops. And perhaps some of the
characteristics of the Civil Law system, such as the belief that reason
can do too much, have helped to accentuate the contradiction between
law and reality. What can a judge do? As Ehrlich has said, "There
is no excuse, as it were, for squeezing decisions out of a statute with
a hydraulic press."7 There is no easy way out. Even at the height
of post-revolutionary France, article 4 of the French Civil Code pro-
vided that the judge who refused to render a decision under the
pretext of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the law was liable
to prosecution for a refusal of justice. Professor Roger Perrot has
observed that:
[T]he judge has the immense power to transform a ready made
garment into a tailor-made suit at the price of alterations that
may be considerable and sometimes rather unexpected. From this
it has often been deduced that the judicial authority is thus able
to perform a work of rejuvenation
No legal system can survive in any society without an acceptable
degree of judicial discretion. In the Civil Law, one finds discretion
at the following levels: discretion in the Civil Law as a system, discre-
tion within the civil codes, and discretion within the particular rules
of those codes.
7. EHRLICH, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, in SCIENCE OF
LEGAL METHOD: SELECTED ESSAYS 76 (1969).
8. Perrot, supra note 4. at 496.
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Discretion within the system itself is a technique which gives am-
ple leeway to the judge in his characterization or interpretation of
the facts. When a judge is faced with a particular set of facts, he
has the choice of placing those facts under one legal category or
another-he has a choice in characterizing the facts according to law.
An example of this technique is the decision of the Supreme Court
of the writer's own country, Peru, regarding irregular marriages. A
large percentage of the people of Peru live under irregular marriages,
which means the parties cohabit without having gone through the ac-
cepted procedure for contracting a legally valid marriage. The ques-
tion of the legal effect of these irregular marriages has been the sub-
ject of much discussion. Until recently, the legislature in Peru refused
to give legal effect to irregular marriages, and the Supreme Court,
in principle, could do nothing to recognize such unions. But, it was
still very difficult for the judges to ignore completely a phenomenon
that was occurring among an enormously large percentage of the
population. The Supreme Court of Peru then found a way out by
characterizing the facts of such a situation in an imaginative and unex-
pected way. The case was an unusual one in which the "husband"
died after living with his "wife" for thirty or thirty-five years and
after raising a family together and being, for all practical purposes,
like any other family except for the lack of legal sanction. All of his
legal inheritance was to be inherited not by the woman with whom
he lived, but by some of his blood relatives. The Court declared, on
the basis of the couple's having lived together for so many years,
that there existed between the man and the woman a "de facto" part-
nership that should produce all the effects of such an association. As
a partnership ends by the death of one of the partners, so had this
"de facto" partnership ended by the demise of the husband. Hence,
the assets and liabilities of the husband were to be liquidated, with
half of the proceeds going to the woman and the other half to the
man's estate. Like Hamlet, the judge in such cases could say: "I could
be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a King of infinite space."
The second technique for exercising discretion within a Civil Law
system is through the interpretation of the law. There are some codes
which attempt to be as precise and exact as possible concerning the
methods of interpretation to be used, such as literal interpretation,
logical interpretation, and exegetical interpretation. But, always it is
the judge who must choose among the many methods available.
One of the great Louisiana jurists, Judge Albert Tate, said on
one occasion that the legal problem is not always simple; the mean-
ing of the law may not be clear, hence it must admit of judicial discre-
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tion in interpretation in order to produce a just result.' Thus, the
choice of methods of interpretation to produce a just result is always
an exercise of judicial discretion. Professor Julio Cueto-Rua, in Judicial
Methods of Interpretation of the Law, has very aptly noted that: "In
choosing the method to which he will turn when a grammatical-logical
approach is unsuccessful, the judge will choose that method of inter-
pretation which will yield the most fruitful result in the case. By most
fruitful result is meant that result most consistent with justice."'"
In The Merchant of Venice, Shylock insisted on specific performance
of Antonio's bond, even though Antonio had offered him money in
lieu of the pound of his flesh which he had committed himself to give
in case of default. The judge, in exercising his discretion, had a choice
of several methods of interpretation by which to reach a just result.
He decided that Shylock should have his pound of flesh, but added
that he was not entitled to a single drop of blood. The judge in this
case used the literal method of interpretation to reach what he thought
was the most just solution to the case.
Apart from these general techniques present within the codes
themselves, the judge in the Civil Law tradition has sufficient discre-
tion to achieve a justice beyond that granted by the mere words of
the law. Professor Merryman, for instance, states:
[Tihat the dogma that a code can be complete and coherent fails
to survive even a cursory glance at the jurisprudence. . . .The
books are full of decisions in which the court has had to fill gaps
in the legislative scheme and reconcile apparently conflicting
statutes. Although the text of a statute remains unchanged, its
meaning and applications often change in response to social
pressures, and new problems arise that are not even touched on
by any existing legislation.
However complete a code might seem, there will always be gaps and
interstices which require the judge's exercise of discretion.
The gaps in statutes or codes are a reality that must be recog-
nized. How can those gaps be filled? There are several solutions pro-
vided in the legislation itself. First, for example, the Civil Code of
Switzerland, which dates from 1912, establishes in article 1 that all
9. Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 LA. L. REV. 727,
754 (1962).
10. J. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW 276 (1981).
11. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 44.
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gaps left by the code are to be filled in by the judge, who acts as
a legislator. Professor Alfred E. von Overbeck has noted in this regard
that "the Swiss legislator was the first modern legislator to recognize
that he needs the judge to achieve his own tasks. .". .", Even though
the Austrian code dates from 1811 and its text does not seem to per-
mit expressly the use of the same technique allowed under the Swiss
code, more than one commentator has interpreted article 7 of the
Austrian Civil Code as allowing the judge to act as a legislator in
such cases.
Another code technique used for filling gaps is legislation that
requires the judge to resort to general principles of law. This is the
solution opted for in the Argentine Civil Code of 1869;'1 the Swiss
code of 1912; 4 the 1932 Civil Code of Mexico; 5 the Peruvian Civil Code
of 1936;"6 the 1942 Civil Code of Brazil;17 and the Italian Civil Code
of 1942."8 The use of such general principles of law allows the judge
ample resources from which to draw in deciding cases involving gaps
in the law, and some of those codes are even more precise.
The doctrine of abuse of right is a doctrine of long-standing in
many Civil Law countries. The doctrine of abuse of right condemns
not only the exercise of a right but the abusive use of it in such a
way as to damage another person. In Louisiana, this doctrine appears
only tangentially in article 623 of the Civil Code, which establishes
the rule that a "usufruct may be terminated by the naked owner if
the usufructuary commits waste, alienates things without authority,
neglects to make ordinary repairs, or abuses his enjoyment in any
other manner." A good example of the application of the doctrine of
abuse of right is found in literature, specifically in Shylock's efforts
to exercise his right against Antonio. As pointed out earlier, when
Antonio fell into default and could not pay Shylock, the latter deman-
ded the pound of flesh to which he was entitled as a result of his
agreement with Antonio. The exercise of that stipulation was,
however, an abuse of right because Shylock could have received money
for the payment of both the principal and interest due, since Antonio,
although late, did offer a repayment in money. Besides this literary
comparison, the doctrine of abuse of right has very interesting modern
12. von Overbeck, Some Observations on the Role of the Judge Under the Swiss Civil
Code, 37 LA. L. REV. 681, 685 (1977).
13. Codigo Civil de la Republica Argentina art. 16 (1869).
14. Code Civil Suisse art. 4 (1912).
15. Codigo Civil Para El Distrito y Territorios Federales art. 19 (1932).
16. Codigo Civil Peruano art. 23 (1936).
17. Codigo Civil Brasileiro art. 4 (1942).
18. Codice Civile del Regno D'Italia art. 12 (1942).
52, [Vol. 43
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uses in such fields as antitrust legislation, especially in the European
Economic Community, where monopolies are not condemned per se,
but only insofar as they constitute an abuse of a dominant position
in the market.
Another general principle of law to which judges may turn in filling
gaps is the principle that condemns undue or unjust enrichment. Un-
just enrichment is based upon the tenet that no one ought to enrich
himself at the expense of another. An example of unjust enrichment
is provided by a case heard by the Supreme Court of Peru in which
the facts centered around the credit sale of a second-hand truck. The
dealer asked for a 20 percent down payment, and for the remainder
of the purchase price, he asked the buyer to sign a number of prom-
issory notes. In the sales agreement, it was stipulated that if the
buyer defaulted in the payment of two installments, the dealer would
repossess the truck. As could be anticipated, the truck broke down
soon after the sale, and the purchaser, unable to work as a result,
could not pay the remainder of the price. Consequently, the dealer
repossessed the truck and not only kept the down payment but also
sued for the balance due under the promissory notes. Even though
the seller had the formal right to sue on the notes, the court rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the seller
would otherwise be unduly enriched.
A third, widely recognized general principle of law relied upon
by judges in filling gaps in the law is that of equity. As it is understood
within the meaning of articles 21, 1903, 1964, and 1965 of the Loui-
siana Civil Code, equity is based on natural law, on reason, and on
the idea that one should not do unto others that which he would not
wish others to do unto him. If there are any doubts about how broad
the powers of a judge are under article 21, one need only quote Judge
Tate, who says:
[Ais a practicing state appellate judge for twenty-five years prior
to my federal service, I must confess that instances arise with
increasing frequency in the present day in which, with all the
judicial good faith in the world, no real legislative intent or text
can be found to have intended to govern a particular new conflict
of interest. In the past I have spoken of this dilemma, arising in
part from rapid changes (which in a new social context deprive
the literal legislative text of any functionally-intended application
to a "new" -unforeseen or unanticipated- conflict of interest), and
also from the legislative preoccupation with social and governmen-
tal problems of greater magnitude than the tinkering with private
law to keep it current. On those occasions I have suggested that
19821
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article 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code permits the Louisiana judge,
in the unprovided-for case, to formulate the new law-rule or law-
application on the basis of its fairness and social utility, as would
a legislator."9
The use of equity, however, is not a matter of pure legal technique.
It also has great ethical significance. Consider the situation in the
New Testament when Jesus Christ was asked, by someone who
wanted to put him in a difficult situation, whether it was legal for
a man whose lamb had fallen into a pit to work on Sunday in order
to get the lamb out. Jesus replied: "It is lawful to do good on the
Sabbath.2 0
Finally, the judge exercises discretion with regard to particular
rules of law. A general survey of the Louisiana Civil Code, for in-
stance, provides numerous examples of such rules allowing the exer-
cise of judicial discretion. In the first place, the judge in some cases
must determine whether an agreement or obligation is or is not against
the public order or the public good. For example, article 11 provides:
Individuals can not by their conventions derogate from the force
of laws made for the preservation of public order or good morals.
But in all cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly prohibited
they can renounce what the law has established in their favor,
when the renunciation does not affect the rights of others, and
is not contrary to the public good.
Likewise, under articles 217, 1892, and 2031, in cases closely connected
with the notion of public good, the judge must decide what constitutes
good morals or bonos mores." In other cases, the judge must decide
when someone has acted in good faith or with good intention.2  Con-
19. Tate, The "New" Judicial Solution: Occasions for and Limits to Judicial Cre-
ativity, 54 TUL. L. REV. 877, 885 (1980).
20. See Matthew 12:11-12.
21. "As long as the child remains under the authority of his father and mother,
he is bound to obey them in everything which is not contrary to good morals and
the laws." LA. CIv. CODE art. 217 (emphasis added).
"That is considered as morally impossible, which is forbidden by law, or contrary
to morals. All contracts having such an object are void." LA. Civ. CODE art. 1892 (em-
phasis added).
"Every condition of a thing impossible, or contra bonos mores (repugnant to moral
conduct) or prohibited by law, is null, and renders void the agreement which depends
on it." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2031.
22. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1901, 3006 & 3033.
Article 1901 provides: "Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws on
those who have formed them.
They can not be revoked, unless by mutual consent of the parties, or for causes
acknowledged by law.
They must be performed with good faith." (emphasis added).
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versely, the judge has discretion in determining when a spouse has
acted in bad faith in the management of the community under article
2354.23 In examining the intention of the parties, the judge at times
must not only determine good and bad faith but must also examine
the parties' motives in terms of interest or passion.2"
A determination of whether an act has or has not been performed
in a reasonable manner is also within the discretion of the judge.25
In other instances, the judge is called upon to evaluate certain
circumstances," to examine the nature of a particular relationship, 7
to determine the intention of the parties, 28 and to determine whether
Article 3006 provides: "In case of an indefinite power, the attorney can not be sued
for what he has done with good intention.
The judge must have regard to the nature of the affair, and the difficulty of com-
munication between the principal and the attorney." (emphasis added).
Article 3033 provides: "In the cases above enumerated, the engagements of the agent
are carried into effect in favor of third persons acting in good faith." (emphasis added).
23. "A spouse is liable for any loss or damage caused by fraud or bad faith in
the management of the community property." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2354 (emphasis added).
24. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 419: "He who petitions for the interdiction of any person,
and fails in obtaining such interdiction, may be prosecuted for and sentenced to pay
damages, if he shall have acted from motives of interest or passion." (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE arts. 218 & 2937.
Article 218 provides: "An unemancipated minor can not quit the parental house
without the permission of his father and mother, who have the right to correct him,
provided it be done in a reasonable manner." (emphasis added).
Article 2937 provides: "The depositary is bound to use the same diligence in preserv-
ing the deposit that he uses in preserving his own property." (emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 160 & 231.
Article 160 provides in part: "In determining whether the claimant spouse is entitled
to alimony, the court shall consider his or her earning capability, in light of all other
circumstances." (emphasis added).
Likewise, article 231 provides: "Alimony shall be granted in proportion to the wants
of the person requiring it, and the circumstances of those who are to pay it." (em-
phasis added).
27. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE art. 3006: "The judge must have regard to the nature
of the affair, and the difficulty of communication between the principal and the at-
torney." (emphasis added).
28. "Transactions regulate only the differences which appear clearly to be com-
prehended in them by the intention of the parties, whether it be explained in a general
or particular manner, unless it be the necessary consequence of what is expressed;
and they do not extend to differences which the parties never intended to include
in them." LA. CIv. CODE art. 3073 (emphasis added).
"Legal agreements having the effects of law upon the parties, none but the parties
can abrogate or modify them. Upon this principal are established the following
rules: . ..
That courts are bound to give legal effect to all such contracts according to the
true intent of all the parties." LA. CIv. CODE art. 1945 (emphasis added).
"When there is anything doubtful in agreements, we must endeavor to ascertain
what was the common intention of the parties, rather than to adhere to the literal
1982]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
something has been done with prudence.' The Code grants a judge
ample discretion to determine whether or not an agreement or act
constitutes simple lesion.' In other instances, the judge is given even
broader discretion as, for example, when he is called upon to deter-
mine whether or not an act or agreement is immoral or plainly unjust"1
or when he is given latitude in assessing damages." There are also
instances in which the discretion of the judge is expressly established.'
Finally, to come full circle, paragraph 10 of article 3556 defines discre-
tion: "When it is said that something is left to the discretion of the
judge, it signifies that he ought to decide according to the rules of
equity and the nature of the circumstances.""4
In completing the circle, one can return to the situation in which
Sancho Panza found himself when confronted with the man who, upon
being questioned about his entry into the village, replied that he was
going to be hanged. In terms reminiscent of Portia's speech on the
quality of mercy, or of the text of article 21 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, Sancho Panza allowed the man to go free, stating that in cases
when justice is in doubt, the judge should be merciful.
sense of the terms in a sense which would render it nugatory." LA. CIv. CODE art.
1950 (emphasis added).
29. "In managing the business, he [the negotiorum gestor] is obligated to use all
the care of a prudent administrator." LA. CiV. CODE art. 2298 (emphasis added).
30. "Minors, not emancipated, are relievable against simple lesion in every species
of contract. That is called simple lesion, in which the amount to be suffered by it,
is not designated by law, as it is in the cases above mentioned of partition and sale
between persons of full age." LA. CIv. CODE art. 1864.
"A simple lesion gives occasion to rescission, in favor of a minor not emancipated,
against all sorts of engagements; and in favor of a minor emancipated, against all
engagements exceeding the bounds of his capacity, as is laid down under the title:
Of Minors, of their Tutorship and Emancipation." LA. CiV. CODE art. 2222.
31. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1757(2) & 1758(1).
Article 1757(2) provides: "A natural obligation is one which can not be enforced by
action, but which is binding on the party who makes it, in conscience and according
to natural justice." (emphasis added).
Article 1758(1) provides: "Natural obligations are of four kinds:
1. Such obligations as the law has rendered invalid for the want of certain forms
or for some reason of general policy, but which are not in themselves immoral
or unjust." (emphasis added).
32. For instance, Civil Code article 2127 states that "Itihe penalty may be modified
by the judge, when the principal obligation has been partly executed, except in case
of a contrary agreement."
33. "Presumptions, not established by law, are left to the judgment and discre-
tion of the judge, who ought to admit none but weighty, precise and consistent presump-
tions, and only in cases where- the law admits testimonial proof, unless the act be
attacked on account of fraud or deceit." LA. CiV. CODE art. 2288 (emphasis added).
34. (Emphasis added). Although the examples given in the text have been limited
to those contained in the Louisiana Civil Code, comparable examples could have just
as readily been provided from codes of most Civil Law countries.
[Vol. 43
